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Abstract 
Suppose that scientific realists believe that a successful theory is approximately true, and that 
constructive empiricists believe that it is empirically adequate. Whose belief is more likely to 
be false? The problem of underdetermination does not yield an answer to this question one 
way or the other, but the pessimistic induction does. The pessimistic induction, if correct, 
indicates that successful theories, both past and current, are empirically inadequate. It is 
arguable, however, that they are approximately true. Therefore, scientific realists overall take 
less epistemic risk than constructive empiricists. 
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1. Introduction 
The cell theory, the Big Bang theory, the theory of electromagnetism, and the theory of 
thermodynamics are all successful scientific theories. A theory is said to be successful “if it 
makes substantially correct predictions, if it leads to efficacious interventions in the natural 
order, if it passes a battery of standard tests” (Laudan, 1981: 23). Laudan’s definition of 
success captures the most important aspect of the aforementioned scientific theories, viz., 
some observational consequences of each of them have turned out to be true. What can we 
infer from the fact that some observational consequences are revealed to be true? Scientific 
realists (‘realists’ henceforth) and constructive empiricists (‘empiricists’ henceforth) have 
different answers to this question.  
Suppose that realists infer that a successful scientific theory is approximately true, and 
that empiricists infer that it is empirically adequate. An interesting question arises: whose 
belief is more likely to be false? My answer is that the empiricist belief is more likely to be 
false than the realist one. My contention collides with what some philosophers say in the 
literature: 
 
Certainly the realist takes an extra epistemic risk by believing the background theories to be  
(approximately) true rather than only empirically adequate. (Ladyman, Douven, Horsten, and  
van Fraassen, 1997: 308)  
 
On a charitable interpretation, however, these philosophers mean truth, not approximate truth. 
After all, they are not in the context of adjudicating between approximate truth and empirical 
adequacy, but in the context of disputing the reliability of inference to the best explanation. 
They must be unreflectively following the standard practice of putting ‘(approximately)’ in 
front of ‘true.’ That is, they used the qualifier ‘approximately’ without seriously reflecting on 
the contest between approximate truth and empirical adequacy.  
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In this paper, I will explore in depth the issue of which notion involves more epistemic 
risk, approximate truth or empirical adequacy. I will argue that the problem of 
underdetermination does not come out in favor of either one over the other, but that the 
pessimistic induction does. The pessimistic induction, if correct, indicates that empirical 
adequacy is harder to come by than approximate truth. It will be shown that approximate 
truth withstands the gauntlet of the pessimistic induction better than empirical adequacy. My 
thesis may be surprising to those who casually think that we are epistemically safer, if we 
restrict our beliefs to observables.  
 
2. Ground Clearing 
Empiricists might argue that realists take a greater epistemic risk than empiricists because the 
content of the realist belief goes beyond that of the empiricist belief. Realists believe what a 
theory says about observables and unobservables whereas empiricists believe only what a 
theory says about observables. To put it another way, realists believe that a successful theory 
is approximately true, so they ipso facto believe that it is empirically adequate, whereas 
empiricists believe only that it is empirically adequate. Thus, realists believe what empiricists 
believe, plus they believe more. Believing more means a higher probability of error. 
Therefore, we can know a priori that the realist belief has a greater chance of being false than 
the empiricist belief. We do not need to consider the contest between the rivaling beliefs in 
the light of underdetermination and the pessimistic induction. 
The foregoing argument, however, has a flaw. An approximately true theory is not 
necessarily empirically adequate. It describes unobservables incorrectly to some degree. The 
mischaracterization of unobservables may not affect observational consequences, in which 
case the theory is empirically adequate. But it may affect observational consequences to some 
degree, in which case the theory is approximately empirically inadequate. A theory can be 
said to be approximately empirically adequate, if all of its observational consequences are 
individually approximately true, or if “most of its observational consequences are true” (Park, 
2009: 117, footnote). Thus, an approximately true theory is either empirically adequate or 
approximately empirically adequate. My contention would be endorsed by Mizrahi:  
 
..mature scientific theories are approximately true, which seems to mean that the world should  
behave “exactly as if” those theories are true, or at least to a very high degree of ‘as if’, not “to  
some extent as if” they are true (or some other low degree of ‘as if’). (Mizrahi, 2012: 136) 
 
To say that the world behaves “exactly as if” a successful theory is true entails that it is 
empirically adequate. To say that the world operates “to a very high degree as if” a theory is 
true entails that it is approximately empirically adequate. Thus, when realists believe that a 
theory is approximately true, they may believe not that it is empirically adequate but that it is 
approximately empirically adequate.  
Empiricists might insist that even if realists settle for approximate truth, the realist 
belief has more content than the empiricist belief because the realist belief concerns 
unobservables whereas the empiricist belief does not. The realist belief has the extra content 
that the empiricist belief does not have. Of course, the empiricist belief also has the extra 
content that the realist belief does not have, given that the content of the empiricist belief 
about observables goes beyond the content of the realist belief about observables. But the 
extra realist content is greater than the extra empiricist content because the extra realist 
content involves unobservables whereas the extra empiricist content involves observables. 
Therefore, the realist belief is more likely to be false than the empiricist belief. 
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The foregoing empiricist argument is suspect. The premise that the extra realist content 
involves unobservables whereas the extra empiricist content involves observables does not 
justify the conclusion that the extra realist content is greater than the extra empiricist content. 
An additional premise is required for the argument to be convincing. After all, unobservables 
do not have the magical power that makes the content of a human belief about them greater 
than the content of a human belief about observables. An example would be useful to support 
this abstract point. 
Suppose that a scientific theory consists of five theoretical statements. When conjoined 
with auxiliary assumptions, they entail infinitely many observational consequences. Realists 
believe that four of the five theoretical statements are true, and that 90% of the infinitely 
many observational consequences are true. In contrast, empiricists believe that 100% of the 
infinitely many observational consequences are true. Whose belief has a greater content? It is 
not clear what the correct answer is. Suppose that 10% of all the infinitely many 
observational consequences are over four million observational statements. There is no 
guarantee that the contents of over four million observational statements are smaller than the 
contents of the four theoretical statements.  
The point of the preceding example is to show that it is difficult to compare the 
contents of two beliefs if one belief does not entail the other belief. Given that the realist 
belief does not entail the empiricist belief, it is difficult to determine a priori that the content 
of the realist belief is greater than the content of the empiricist belief, and hence the realist 
belief is more likely to be false than the empiricist belief. For this reason, I turn to the 
problem of underdetermination and the pessimistic induction.  
 
3. Adjudication 
3.1. The Problem of Underdetermination 
Consider van Fraassen’s famous example of underdetermination (1980: 46). Newton’s theory 
of motion consists of the law of inertia, F=ma, the law of action-reaction, F=Gm1m2/r
2
, and 
the postulate that the gravitational center of the solar system is at absolute rest. We can 
generate an infinite number of competing theories by varying the absolute velocity of the 
center. They are all empirically equivalent to each other, i.e., they make the same claims 
about observables. They are, however, incompatible with each other because they make 
different claims about the absolute velocity of the gravitational center which is unobservable. 
It appears that observation cannot determine which of them is true, and that we are not 
justified in believing that Newton’s theory of motion is true.  
Suppose that realists believe that Newton’s theory of motion is approximately true, and 
that empiricists believe that it is empirically adequate. Who take a greater epistemic risk? It is 
not clear what the correct answer is. Initially, it seems that realists take the greater epistemic 
risk because they believe what the theory says about unobservables. As Psillos (1997: 370) 
points out, however, from the fact that rival theories are empirically equivalent to each other, 
it does not necessarily follow that they are empirically adequate. They might be far less than 
empirically adequate. Thus, an argument is required to move from empirical equivalence to 
empirical adequacy, and empiricists take some epistemic risk when they infer that Newton’s 
theory of motion is empirically adequate.  
Empiricists might argue that Newton’s theory of motion is empirically adequate under 
the assumption that one of the rival theories is true. After all, a theory empirically equivalent 
to a true theory is necessarily empirically adequate. Therefore, the empiricist belief is true. 
Realists would reply, however, that if one of the rival theories is true, the rest of them “are all 
approximately true because they share the important assumptions: the three laws of motion 
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and the law of gravity” (Park, 2001: 123). Therefore, van Fraassen’s example of 
underdetermination does not support the claim that empirical adequacy is more obtainable 
than approximate truth or vice versa. As it stands, we do not know which one is more 
procurable. 
     Let me turn to the example of quantum mechanics. Bohm’s version of quantum 
mechanics is empirically equivalent to von Neumann and Dirac’s version of quantum 
mechanics, but they differ radically in their claims about unobservables. The former claims 
that micro-events are determinate just like macro-events, and that there exists something that 
can travel faster than light, while the latter claims that unlike macro-events, micro-events are 
indeterminate, and nothing travels faster than light. In short, the two versions make radically 
different claims about unobservables. Accordingly, we are not justified in believing that von 
Neumann and Dirac’s version is approximately true. It is reasonable, however, to believe that 
it is empirically adequate. Therefore, empirical adequacy is epistemically closer to us than 
approximate truth is. So it seems. 
However, if the two versions of quantum mechanics are not even approximately true, it 
is not clear how they are so successful in predicting phenomena. In general, a completely 
false theory does not make substantially true predictions. How can a theory which makes 
completely false claims about unobservables nonetheless pass the battery of standard tests? 
As Putnam (1975: 73) puts it, it would be a miracle if a completely false theory were 
successful. Thus, we have two different intuitions pulling in opposite directions. It is 
controversial whether the two versions of quantum mechanics are approximately true or 
completely false. 
It is also controversial whether the two versions of quantum mechanics are empirically 
adequate or inadequate. As we previously noted, from the fact that rival theories are empirical 
equivalent, it does not necessarily follow that they are empirically adequate. After all, 
empirically inadequate theories can be empirically equivalent to each other. From the fact 
that the two versions of quantum mechanics are successful, it does not necessarily follow that 
they are empirically adequate. Success involves the truth of some observational consequences, 
whereas empirical adequacy involves the truth of all observational consequences. An 
argument is required to infer from some to all. In the absence of an argument, it is simply an 
open question whether the two versions are empirically adequate or inadequate. We cannot 
rule out the possibility that they are approximately empirically adequate or far less than 
approximately empirically adequate. Therefore, realism is no worse off than antirealism vis-
à-vis the underdetermination of quantum mechanics. 
Both the underdetermination of Newtonian mechanics and that of quantum mechanics 
are inert as arbiters between approximate truth and empirical adequacy. In discussing the 
former, I assumed that one of the rival theories is true. In discussing the latter, in contrast, I 
did not make such an assumption. I operated only under the premises that the two rival 
versions of quantum mechanics are empirically equivalent, and that they are equally 
successful. In both cases of underdetermination, empirical adequacy did not come out as a 
winner over approximate truth. This conclusion would be endorsed by Leplin (1997) and 
Stanford (2000). 
Leplin and Stanford argue that when a true theory competes with a false theory, there is 
bound to be structural similarity between them beyond observational similarity. The structural 
similarity ensures that the false theory is approximately true:  
 
..false, successful theories bear some connection or similarity to the true one beyond predictive  
success, which explains their predictive success. (Leplin, 1997: 14)  
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..any two theories that make similar predictions over a domain of any significant extent, there is  
sure to be something we could fasten onto as a structural similarity or isomorphism between  
them. (Stanford, 2000: 274) 
 
If Leplin and Stanford are right that a false theory competing with a true theory is bound to be 
approximately true, it is clear that underdetermination does not favor empiricism over realism, 
i.e., that underdetermination does not yield the reason for thinking that approximate truth is 
epistemically farther from us than empirical adequacy. 
 
3.2. The Pessimistic Induction 
Unlike the problem of underdetermination, the pessimistic induction, if correct, does show 
that approximate truth is more attainable than empirical adequacy. The pessimistic induction 
asserts that successful present theories are false because successful past theories are false:  
 
The ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the man of the world. Their brief  
period of prosperity ended, he sees them abandoned one after the other; he sees ruins piled upon  
ruins; he predicts that the theories in fashion today will in a short time succumb in their turn,  
and he concludes that they are absolutely in vain. (Poincaré, 1905/1952: 160) 
 
It is well-known in the literature that the pessimistic induction poses a serious threat to the 
realist quest for truth, but it is not widely appreciated that the pessimistic induction poses an 
equal threat to the empiricist aspiration to empirical adequacy: 
 
The successful past theories turned out to be empirically inadequate. So successful current  
theories will turn out to be empirically inadequate as well. (Park, 2001: 78) 
 
Most of these theories eventually turned out not to be empirically adequate. Therefore, we  
should believe that probably, most of the theories we currently accept are not empirically  
adequate either. (Lange, 2002: 282) 
 
Successful past theories, such as the phlogiston theory of combustion and the caloric theory 
of heat, turned out to be false when they ran into anomalies, which implies that they were 
disclosed to be empirically inadequate. Thus, the pessimistic induction refutes the empiricist 
position that a successful theory is empirically adequate.  
Does the pessimistic induction also devastate the realist position that a successful 
theory is approximately true? If Kitcher and Psillos are right, the answer is no. Kitcher (1993: 
140-149) argues that the ether theory might be approximately true, given that its working 
posits are true, although its idle posits are false, in the light of current theories. From the 
historical fact that working posits of the caloric theory of heat were carried over to the kinetic 
theory of heat, and from the historical fact that the most eminent caloric theorists were not 
committed to the truth of the idle posits of the theory, Psillos concludes that “it makes perfect 
sense to talk of the approximate truth of this theory [the caloric theory of heat]” (1999: 113). 
Antirealists’ critical response to Kitcher’s approach and Psillos’s approach to the 
pessimistic induction in the literature is to argue that it is hard to distinguish between idle and 
working assumptions of current theories, although it is relatively easy to discriminate 
between idle and working assumptions of past theories in retrospect. Stanford puts the 
problem as follows:  
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The problem with this strategy, of course, is that at the time of our commitment to a theory it is  
not usually possible to separate its operative elements from the extra baggage (assuming that  
this separation is coherent at all), as Maxwell’s famous remark (paraphrased in Laudan 1981,  
114) that ‘the aether was better confirmed than any other theoretical entity in natural philosophy’  
reminds us. (Stanford, 2000: 278, footnote) 
 
If Maxwell is right, the ether theorists were confident of the truth of those elements of the 
ether theory that turned out to be idle. This goes against realists’ presupposition that scientists 
can isolate the idle elements of a current theory and can avoid assenting to their truths.  
Let me make a few comments about Stanford’s critical response to Kitcher and Psillos. 
Firstly, Kitcher makes an important point about Maxwell’s remark as reported by Laudan, 
viz., “Maxwell was wrong” (1993: 149). His claim is based on his detailed case study on the 
ether theory, which I will not rehearse here. The upshot of his case study is that the working 
posits of Fresnel’s ether theory are “endorsed by contemporary physics” (1993: 145), that 
“Fresnel typically makes no detailed claims about the nature of this medium [ether]” (1993: 
147), and that the success of the ether theory provided support only for the working posits. 
Secondly, Stanford’s criticism, even if correct, does not knock down Kitcher and 
Psillo’s suggestion that working parts are distinguishable from idle parts. All it shows is that 
realists need to do more work to come up with a principled distinction between idle 
assumptions and working assumptions. I (2011: 23-29) have recently attempted to improve 
Kitcher and Psillos’s criteria. Let me briefly introduce here a criterion to recognize a working 
posit. In certain cases in science, a constituent of T1 and a constituent of T2 jointly explain a 
third phenomenon. Both T1 and T2 have their own observational evidence. Neither T1 nor T2 
can explain the third phenomenon alone; they have to work together to explain it. In such 
cases, the constituent of T1 and the constituent of T2 are working posits and hence they will 
survive scientific revolutions in the future.  
Thirdly, and the most important of all, even if there is no principled distinction between 
working and idle assumptions, we can say that successful past theories are approximately true. 
Suppose that the ether theory was comprised of ten theoretical claims: seven of them were 
carried over to its corresponding current theory, but three were not. We can then say that the 
ether theory was approximately true in the current light, even if we cannot find the common 
features of the seven carried-over theoretical claims and the common features of the three 
defunct theoretical claims. What counts is not whether or not we can separate operative 
elements from extra baggage but whether or not a theory is close to the truth. A theory can be 
said to be close to the truth in the light of its subsequent theory, if a significant portion of the 
theory survives a scientific revolution. Our inability to tell exactly which elements will be 
retained and which will be discarded does not prevent us from attributing approximate truth 
to a theory. In contrast, we cannot say that the successful past theories are empirically 
adequate; after all, they clearly ran into anomalies. Therefore, the empiricist belief that a 
successful theory is empirically adequate is more likely to be false than the realist belief that 
it is approximately true. 
     Laudan (1981) would object that successful past theories cannot even be approximately 
true, even if their working assumptions are true, because their central terms do not refer. The 
phlogiston theory and the ether theory, for instance, are completely false because the key 
terms ‘phlogiston’ and ‘ether’ do not refer. In other words, since the successful past theories 
are about nonexistent objects, they cannot even be approximately true. 
In response, Kitcher (1993: 75-105) develops a theory of reference that the reference of 
a token of a scientific term is fixed in three ways: the descriptive mode, the baptismal mode, 
and the conformist mode. The terms, ‘phlogiston’ and ‘dephlogisticated air,’ fail to refer, if 
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their references are fixed solely by the descriptive mode of reference, because there is no 
substance emitted in combustion. On some occasions, however, phlogiston theorists use the 
baptismal mode of reference or the conformist mode of reference to pick out an object. On 
those occasions, ‘dephlogisticated air’ refers to oxygen, and their assertions about the referent 
of ‘dephlogisticated air’ are true (Kitcher, 1993: 100-102). In short, in some contexts 
‘dephlogisticated air’ refers to oxygen, and phlogiston theorists made true assertions about 
oxygen. 
Psillos (1999, Chapter 12) develops his own theory of reference the gist of which is 
that a theoretical term refers to a theoretical entity in virtue of the causal relation between 
“kind-constitutive properties” of the theoretical entity and “core causal descriptions” 
associated with the theoretical term. A kind-constitutive property is a property that makes an 
object belong to a kind. A core causal description is a description of a kind-constitutive 
property; it has its causal origin in the kind-constitutive property. The core causal 
descriptions of the ether theory are descriptions of the properties of a putative entity that 
cause light phenomena. Psillos argues that ‘ether’ refers to the electromagnetic field “because 
the core causal description associated with the term ‘electromagnetic field’ takes up the core 
causal description associated with the term ‘ether’” (1999: 296).  
My response to the problem of reference is to argue like Psillos (1999: 294) that the 
key terms of the past theories approximately refer to the referents of the key terms of their 
corresponding present theories. For example, ‘phlogiston’ and ‘ether’ approximately refer to 
oxygen and electromagnetic field. The justification for this assertion is that the past theories 
and the present theories share assumptions. On this account, reference is determined by 
description and is not an all-or-nothing affair. Past theoretical terms are not complete 
referential failures. 
 
4. Objections and Replies 
Empiricists might admit that the pessimistic induction hits the empiricist belief harder than 
the realist belief, but they might complain that the realist belief is untestable, given that it 
concerns unobservables and allows anomalies. Even if a theory clashes with some 
phenomena, realists may stick to their belief that it is approximately true. Since the realist 
belief is untestable, it is worthless to hold it. In contrast, the empiricist belief is testable. If a 
theory collides with some phenomena, it turns out to be empirically inadequate, so 
empiricists would give up their belief that it is empirically adequate. Since the empiricist 
belief is testable, it is worthwhile to hold it. 
Let me use an analogy to illuminate the difference between the realist belief and the 
empiricist belief in terms of testability. Suppose that there are two cats, one is inside a black 
box, and the other is outside the black box. Realists believe that the cat inside the black box is 
alive, and empiricists believe that the cat outside the black box is alive. They can observe the 
cat outside the black box, but not the cat inside the black box. It turns out that the cat outside 
the black box is dead. The realists claim that in such circumstances, the empiricist belief is 
more likely to be false than the realist belief because the empiricist belief does not even have 
a chance to be true, whereas the realist belief has. The empiricists complain that we cannot 
tell whether the cat inside the black box is alive or dead, so it is worthless to hold the realist 
belief that the act inside the black box is alive. In contrast, it is worthwhile to hold the 
empiricist belief that the cat outside the black box is alive. 
My reply to the preceding possible complaint from empiricists is twofold. First, 
cherishing testability at the cost of holding false beliefs comes with a heavy price, viz., we 
may form all sorts of absurd false beliefs, such as snow is black, and the earth is flat. These 
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provocative beliefs are all false but testable, so the empiricists would say that it is worthwhile 
to hold them. Realists would disagree, pointing out that we enshrine testability because we 
want to avoid false beliefs, i.e., testability is a means to achieve the end of avoiding false 
beliefs. To embrace false beliefs for the sake of testability is to discard the end to achieve the 
means.  
Second, it is merely an assumption that the realist belief is untestable while the 
empiricist belief is testable. An argument is required to justify the assumption. The argument 
cannot appeal to underdetermination because as we previously noted, underdetermination 
does not show that we have a better epistemic access to empirical adequacy than to 
approximate truth. Moreover, realists would protest that their belief is testable. Approximate 
truth entails approximate empirical adequacy, so a theory is revealed to be completely false, if 
most of its observational consequences are disclosed to be false.  
     Empiricists might insist that the realist belief is untestable on the ground that we can 
never ascertain the truths or the falsities of most of observational consequences of a theory. 
The observational consequences are claims about observable events that occurred, occur, and 
will occur, so we can never obtain all the relevant observational data that would reveal that 
most observational consequences of a theory are true or false. Therefore, we can never know 
whether a theory is approximately true or completely false.  
Let me point out, however, that the standard of testability implicit in the foregoing 
criticism is too high. If the realist belief is not testable because we cannot obtain 
observational data corresponding to most of observational consequences of a theory, the 
empiricist belief is not testable either because we cannot obtain observational data 
corresponding to all observational consequences of a theory. It is trivially true that it is harder 
to establish empirical adequacy than approximate empirical adequacy.  
Empiricists might now launch a semantic objection against realism, viz., the notion of 
approximate truth is obscure. It is not clear how close a theory must be to the truth in order to 
be counted as being approximately true. I admit that approximate truth is not a precise notion, 
and there is a huge literature on the definition of approximate truth. I can only defer exploring 
this territory to a future occasion. Let me make a brief point, though, that is not appreciated in 
the literature. Empiricists need the notion of approximate truth too. When scientists perform 
an experiment correctly, there might be a gap between an expected outcome and an actual 
outcome. In such cases, empiricists may have to say that the relevant observational 
consequence is approximately true as opposed to exactly true. 
In order to defend realism, I have piggybacked on the empiricist inference from success 
to empirical adequacy and on the empiricist use of the concept of approximate truth. In order 
to diffuse my strategy, empiricists may now embrace skepticism. Skepticism in this context 
means the refusal to infer anything from the success of a scientific theory. Skeptics do not go 
beyond the belief that some observational consequences of a successful theory are true. They 
do not even believe that a successful theory is empirically adequate. They only challenge 
realists to justify their belief.  
A problem of skepticism in the context of the debate between realists and empiricists is 
that it is off-limit as the following philosophers eloquently put it: 
 
Skepticism is an ugly threat; a philosophical position which leads to skepticism reduces itself to  
absurdity. (Ladyman, Douven, Horsten, and van Fraassen 1997: 317)  
 
Kitcher would agree with these philosophers, for he says that “Skeptics who insist that we 
begin from no assumptions are inviting us to play a mug’s game” (1993: 135). Both realism 
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and empiricism are built upon the assumption that we can go beyond the belief that some 
observational consequences of a successful theory are true. In order to avoid skepticism, 
empiricists must stick their necks out and infer something from the fact that a theory is 
successful.  
 
5. Conclusion 
A moderate position and an ambitious position are available for both realists and empiricists. 
The moderate realist position asserts that successful theories are approximately true; the 
ambitious realist position, that they are exactly true. The moderate empiricist position 
maintains that successful theories are approximately empirically adequate; the ambitious 
empiricist position, that they are empirically adequate. This paper makes it clear, I hope, that 
the ambitious empiricist position is epistemically less secure than the moderate realist 
position in the light of the pessimistic induction, although the problem of underdetermination 
does not decide the issue one way or the other. Thus, being restricted to observational beliefs 
does not guarantee better epistemic security.  
What if empiricists strive for approximate empirical adequacy, and realists for 
approximate truth? Of the two positions, which one should we choose? Clearly, it is harder to 
obtain approximate truth than approximate empirical adequacy because approximate truth 
entail approximate empirical adequacy. In my view, however, better epistemic security is the 
only advantage of empiricism over realism, while there are pragmatic disadvantages of 
empiricism that are not discussed in this paper (Park, 2014, Section 6). Moreover, there are 
pragmatic advantages of realism which outweigh the epistemic advantage of empiricism. 
Accordingly, the realist position is overall better than the empiricist position. Unfortunately, 
other studies are needed to flesh out and defend this bold line of reasoning. 
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